Abstract
I. Introduction
Software testing is a critical component of the software engineering process. Despite studies showing that testing accounts for more than half the software development cost [11] , software bugs persist. A NIST study [33] indicates that software bugs cost the U.S. economy an estimated $60 billion annually. The emergence of multicore architectures and the concomitant push toward concurrent multithreaded software compounds the complexity of the testing process by significantly increasing a program's possible execution paths. New techniques are needed to make software testing tractable and effective for real-world software development.
One promising approach is on-line testing [18, 26, 28, 39] , where tests are run on deployed software systems. By running tests across a wider range of scenarios, these approaches can test a much larger and more diverse set of executions compared to traditional lab-based testing. Safe online testing must be transparent to the system's execution (i.e., not alter program state and correctness). Even if a test leads to corrupted state, the transparency property prevents the application from observing it.
Currently, providing functional transparency for online tests could incur significant overheads [5, 39] , since systems rely on application memory snapshotting via process forking. Our results (Section III(A)) confirm that using fork() for online testing can reduce an apache web server's maximum throughput by as much as 40%. In our view, software customers are not likely to tolerate significant performance artifacts for activities traditionally done during development. Thus, widespread adoption of online testing depends upon mechanisms that provide both functional and performance transparency.
To enable transparent low-overhead online testing, this paper proposes StealthTest. StealthTest uses and extends Transactional Memory (TM) [13, 17] mechanisms to transparently execute online tests. A transaction is a block of code that appears to execute atomically, i.e., it appears to either execute in its entirety at one instant in time or not at all. StealthTest is based on the following key insight: A TM transaction that always aborts provides a transparent mechanism for executing online tests. Test frameworks can enclose and execute online tests within a TM transaction that is explicitly aborted (i.e., rolled back) at the end of the test. Transactions promise both functional transparency-via atomicity-and performance transparency-because they are more light-weight than fork().
Not all TM systems provide sufficient support for StealthTest. We identify four requirements that StealthTest imposes on underlying TM systems: strong atomicity [4] , out-of-band communication mechanisms, flexible conflict resolution and good performance. While hardware support is not a functional requirement, we believe that limited hardware support (e.g., bounded hardware TM) may prove necessary to achieve good performance. To support online tests targeted toward identifying atomicity violations, we propose an optional TM extension inspired by degree 2 consistency in databases [8] .
To demonstrate StealthTest we apply it to two existing online testing frameworks that previously relied on forking threads: in vivo testing (reviewed in Section II(A)) and Delta Execution (Section II(B)). StealthIV and StealthDE are new StealthTest-based frameworks for in vivo testing and Delta Execution, respectively.
We implement StealthTest prototypes on top of three software TM (STM) systems-TL2, Intel STM and a Pin-based TM. We use the software systems to study StealthIV and StealthDE with larger programs from BugBench and STAMP application suites and a set of large workloads from the original Delta Execution paper. We demonstrate that our StealthTest-based frameworks (a) can run a wide range of online tests and (b) execute many more tests with low overhead. This paper makes three contributions:
• We develop StealthTest, the first transparent, lowoverhead online testing interface that uses TM.
• We identify TM properties needed to support online testing (e.g., strong atomicity, out-of-band communication, and flexible conflict resolution).
• We demonstrate StealthTest-based implementations of two existing online testing frameworks-In vivo testing and Delta Execution. StealthTest provides another motivation for efficient TM implementations by extending TM's applicability to a critical software engineering challenge.
We next review In vivo testing and Delta Execution (Section II) and then present new work on StealthTest (Section III), StealthIV (Section IV), StealthDE (Section V) and their evaluation (Section VI).
II. Motivation and Background
To demonstrate the utility of StealthTest, we apply it to two existing online testing frameworks-in vivo testing and Delta Execution. We present a brief overview.
A. Online Bug Detection & In Vivo Testing
Motivation. In "Why Do Computers Stop and What Can Be Done About It" [9] , Jim Gray writes:
"If you consider an industrial software system which has gone through structured design, design reviews, quality assurance, alpha test, beta test, and months or years of production, then most of the "hard" software bugs, ones that always fail on retry, are gone. The residual bugs are rare cases, typically related to strange hardware conditions (rare or transient device fault), limit conditions (out of storage, counter overflow, lost interrupt, etc...) or race conditions (forgetting to request a semaphore)."
It is widely understood that deployed software systems contain bugs. These bugs are often present because they manifest either in rare conditions that cannot be economically simulated during development or because the developer does not fully understand the software or its deployment environment. Figure 1 (top) presents an illustrative example of an actual bug detected in deployed software. It arises due to incorrect ordering of operations as part of an object deletion routine. The mutex protecting the lock object is incorrectly destroyed before the lock is removed from a list. In the interval between mutex destruction and lock removal, a concurrent thread could access the list and find the lock to be still present. Accessing the mutex would lead to a crash.
It has been over two decades since Jim Gray's seminal paper, "Why Do Computers Stop..." [9] . Yet deployed software continues to suffer from the same kinds of soft bugs identified in his paper. The emergence of multicore processors and the projected prominence of multithreaded programming makes identification of these soft bugs much tougher, fueling the need for novel approaches to bug detection. 
In vivo
Testing. In vivo (IV) testing [26] is a new software engineering proposal for supporting continued testing on deployed software platforms with two key features. First, it runs a set of pre-determined tests on deployed software at random times under conditions that cannot be either easily anticipated or recreated in a lab. Second, it does not impact the reliability of deployed software since it isolates the functional effects of a test from the rest of the application. As an example of the benefits of IV testing, consider the software engineering goal of ensuring that an object is never accessed after it is destroyed. Developers could deploy an IV test that walks through the list of objects checking consistency of each of an object's fields. Should the test fail and crash, a bug report can be sent home, but the deployed system operation will not be affected. More-over, even after the bug is fixed, the test can be run as an effective regression test to detect future recurrences. Figure 1 (bottom) shows such a simple IV test that could exercise the previously discussed bug leading to a transparent test failure. ForkIV: A Fork-based In vivo Testing. Murphy et al. [26] implement a test framework, ForkIV, that runs IV tests at random times during an application's execution. It uses fork() to create a new child process, giving the test its own snapshot of memory isolated from the parent. Upon test completion, ForkIV records the test result in a log and discards the process. Developers analyze the logs off-line to detect any bugs. ForkIV can also run tests over a set of deployed instances of the application [5] in order to either decrease the number of tests run per deployed instance of an application or increase the total number of tests run on an application.
B. Online Patch Validation & Delta Execution
Motivation. When bugs are detected after system deployment, developers typically ship software patches to allow end-users to fix them in the field. However, since patches may introduce new bugs, sophisticated end-users generally avoid deploying 'unvalidated' patches [3] . Delta Execution. Delta Execution [39] is a novel approach to online patch validation based on the empirical observation that an unpatched execution is often identical to the patched execution. Hence, when the two executions are identical, DE logically runs them both in a single physical instance (merged execution). It splits and runs distinct physical instances (split execution) only when the executions diverge in either the code they run or the data they access. After a certain time, the two executions can be merged back since they execute the same code accessing identical state. At such a merge point, DE merges the two physical processes back into a single process while recording differences in their state.
DE incurs lower overhead compared to traditional online validation techniques which use two separate instances (e.g., two distinct processes) leading to redundant execution. It can also provide more accurate validation by decreasing sources of non-determinism that cause gratuitous differences [39] . ForkDE: A Fork-based Delta Execution. Tucek et al. [39] propose an initial implementation (ForkDE) based on process fork, as illustrated in Figure 2 (a). ForkDE starts execution as a single process, running until it reaches patched code (delta code). At this split point, ForkDE forks off a child process containing an identical copy of the program state. While the child process executes patched code, the parent executes the original code. After executing delta code, the two processes rendezvous. ForkDE logically merges the executions into the parent process and discards the child process. As part of the merge, it saves the differences in program state (delta data) between the two executions and protects those memory locations using mprotect(). A future access to these locations during merged execution will cause a trap to ForkDE which then re-initiates split execution while ensuring that each execution gets to see its own program state. Note that, in this case, the two executions could execute the same code. Split execution continues until both executions run the same code while accessing identical program state. 
III. StealthTest: Using TM for Online Testing
This section shows that Transactional Memory is an enabling mechanism for low-overhead online testing. It then presents the StealthTest interface and discusses requirements on underlying TM implementations.
A. Motivation
ForkIV and ForkDE take big strides toward online testing by proposing solutions that provide transparent test execution in a deployed environment. However, the use of process forking for ensuring functional transparency leads to an important limitation. Fork Overhead. Forking new processes to run tests is a high-overhead operation. Importantly, the overhead gets even worse in multithreaded applications where all threads need to be stopped to take an atomic snapshot of memory. Figure 3 shows the throughput of an apache web server as the request rate varies. With no testing (ForkIV(0%)), response rate scales linearly up to 1400 requests/sec. With full testing (ForkIV(100%), wherein every request runs an IV test), the response rate scales only to 800 requests/sec. Other lines show how less frequent testing results in intermediate throughput values. Clearly, the performance degradation of substantial testing is unacceptable in deployed applications.
Moreover, forking a process might not be safe at certain points in an application's execution. In some implementations, a fork operation can cause blocking system calls to return with an EINTR error leading to unpredictable application behavior [30] .
B. New Mechanism for Online Testing
What does it take to execute tests transparently? We identify two requirements for a mechanism. First, during test execution, the mechanism needs to isolate the changes made by the test from the application. Second, if the test has made changes to application state, then the mechanism needs to roll back these changes at the end of the test, so that the application does not see the modified state. We observe that Transactional Memory provides both these capabilities and hence is a good candidate for further exploration. 
Figure 3. Fork Performance Overhead
Transactional Memory [13, 17 ] is a language model that attempts to simplify concurrent programming. It allows a programmer to specify transactions -blocks of code that are guaranteed to execute atomically in a global serial order (i.e., the execution is serializable) by the underlying TM system. In order to operate efficiently, TM systems execute a transaction concurrently with the rest of the application code, dynamically isolating the data accessed by the transaction during its execution. In case of a conflict (i.e., the transaction cannot be serialized) during its execution, TM systems can abort the transaction, roll back its changes and flexibly re-execute the transaction at a later point. Thus, we make the observation that TM transactions could provide an efficient transparent enclosure for executing online tests. An online test placed within a transaction will be isolated from the application by the TM system and an explicit rollback at the end guarantees test transparency. No Fork Overhead. TM operations are light-weight compared to process forking. A TM system does not need to halt all application threads to begin a transaction. Neither does it need to duplicate address spaces via page-table manipulations and incur copy-on-write overheads. As our evaluation (Section VI) shows, TM systems can provide low-overhead isolation and rollback. C. StealthTest Interface The next three functions, which rely on TM's version management [24] mechanisms, allow test frameworks to analyze the modifications performed by various code/test sequences. ST_get_new requests the underlying TM system to provide the set of memory modifications (e.g., set of <address, value> pairs) done by a transaction thus far. ST_get_old returns the old (pre-transaction) values corresponding to the locations modified by a transaction. ST_undo unrolls the modifications done by a transaction without releasing transactional isolation on them.
The final three functions enable test frameworks to set up fine-grain memory protection using TM conflict detection mechanisms [24] . ST_protect_set and ST_protect_clear request that the TM system protect and unprotect, respectively, certain memory locations from future memory accesses. Any access to a protected location from outside a StealthTest transaction causes a callback to a conflict handler (registered using ST_register_conflict_callback).
We have designed StealthTest to support online testing using the examples of In vivo testing and Delta Execution patch testing. Nevertheless, we expect-but cannot prove-that StealthTest can be applied or extended to support other online testing frameworks as they emerge.
D. StealthTest Requirements on TM Systems
In addition to requiring access to some internal TM state/mechanisms, StealthTest makes four demands on an underlying TM implementation. Strong Atomicity. To guarantee test transparency, nontransactional memory accesses (e.g., the application code) should not be able to access data accessed by the test transaction. This property is provided by strongly atomic TM systems [4] , because they detect conflicts even on accesses made by non-transactional threads. All current HTMs [17] , some hybrid TM systems [23] and some STMs [1, 36] are strongly atomic. Weakly atomic systems are being scrutinized, however, for other reasons (e.g., privatization [36] 
E. Discussion
Beyond the requirements discussed above, StealthTest benefits from additional TM properties discussed below. Hardware Support for StealthTest. Implementations of StealthTest benefit from hardware support for at least two reasons. First, hardware support in the form of bounded HTM systems could enable efficient strongly atomic TM systems. Second, fine-grained protection calls (e.g., ST_protect_*) could benefit significantly from hardware support if the amount of protected data is large and distributed over multiple pages.
Interaction of Locks & StealthTest Transactions.
Application code (including test transactions) might acquire and release conventional locks. Using a TMagnostic lock library could lead to deadlocks and livelocks [40] . Correct operation requires either dynamically inserted TM-aware wrappers around lock operations or a TM-aware lock library. System Calls within StealthTest Transactions. Support for system calls within transactions [2, 25] is an area of active research. Empirical evidence suggests that many system calls can be supported from within transactions. Nevertheless, some system calls cannot be executed from within a transaction making them ineligible for use within StealthTest tests.
The TM-based mechanisms used by StealthTest are complementary to fork-based mechanisms examined in prior work. Hence, in the (rare) case that StealthTest does not support an online test, we envision falling back to inefficient, but more robust, fork-based mechanisms.
IV. StealthIV: A StealthTest-based Framework for In vivo Testing
StealthIV is a new in vivo test framework that leverages StealthTest. It uses compiler and library support to act as a transformation layer operating in between the application developer and the underlying TM system by enclosing tests within TM transactions. 
A. An Operational View

Figure 4. StealthIV Test Transformation
StealthIV performs two main tasks-transforming tests into transactions and providing infrastructure for launching and executing IV tests. Test Transformation. Developers write a set of IV tests for various modules within the program. During compilation, StealthIV wraps the tests with transactions provided by the underlying TM system (as shown in Figure 4 ). The test result is then written to a separate log using out-of-band TM mechanisms, to ensure that the test result is not lost when the transaction aborts. Finally, the test transaction is explicitly aborted. Launching and Executing Tests. StealthIV also provides the bookkeeping infrastructure for tests. At application initialization, it creates a separate pool of threads for running IV tests. StealthIV launches tests at pro-grammer-specified instrumentation points or at randomly picked locations in the execution. On reaching a test launch point, StealthIV picks a random test and dispatches it to one of the test threads.
B. Detecting Atomicity Violation Bugs
As defined, both ForkIV and StealthIV execute tests atomically. While clean, this behavior prevents IV tests from exercising and discovering atomicity-violation bugs (e.g., the bug in Figure 5 , as reported by Flanagan et al. [7] ) that manifest only when the test thread interacts with one or more remote threads [20] . In order to handle atomicity-violation tests, we need to relax the isolation characteristics of IV tests to allow remote threads to modify data that has been read by a test. 
Figure 5. Why Atomic Tests are insufficient
Other threads might modify sb.length()between execution of two statements. Could lead to an exception when sb.getChars() sees incorrect length (len).
Degree-2 Transactions.
We propose optionally enhancing underlying TM systems with Degree-2 transactions. These are code sequences for which the TM system isolates write operations but not read operations in a manner inspired by Degree-2 consistency in databases [8] . StealthIV then wraps each atomicity-violation test in a Degree-2 transaction. When such a test runs, it can detect an atomicity violation if it reads a datum twice: before and after an application thread writes the datum. Since Degree-2 transactions still isolate their own writes, atomicity violations caused by a non-atomic test do not corrupt application state.
We see three ways to support Degree-2 transactions. First, StealthIV could enclose every read of a Degree-2 transaction in a non-transactional 'escape' action. While inelegant, this solution works without modifying existing TM systems. Second, StealthIV could leverage early release [12] , a technique to remove isolation for a memory location accessed within a transaction. Finally, a TM system could directly support Degree-2 transactions by exposing a mechanism to disable read isolation.
V. StealthDE: A StealthTest-based Framework for Delta Execution
StealthDE combines dynamic instrumentation with StealthTest to form a new Delta Execution framework.
A. An Operational View Figure 6 , where patched_execution runs the patched code while original_execution runs the original code. StealthDE monitors delta data created during split execution using ST_protect_* calls. As a result, it receives a conflict callback from the TM system when delta data is accessed. It can then dynamically insert the DE code sequence in Figure 6 . Note that in this case, the two executions might execute identical code images. Similar to ForkDE, we heuristically attempt to merge executions at every function return when the nesting level is less than the level at the start of split execution. Split Execution. Unlike ForkDE, StealthDE runs the two executions (original and patched) sequentially using TM transactions to monitor and unroll the changes made by the patched execution. As we show in Section VI(D), sequentially running split execution is acceptable since the time spent on forking and merging processes greatly exceeds the time spent in split execution. Patched execution begins by copying the delta data corresponding to its execution into program memory. At the end of patched execution, StealthDE notes all the changes done before rolling them back. It then executes the original code. At the end of original execution, the changes made by the two executions are compared to generate and save the new delta data (generate_delta_data). These locations are then isolated for detecting future accesses. Finally, StealthDE completes split execution by commiting the transaction and moves on to merged execu-tion. For simplicity, we currently support only one atomic split execution at a time. If this becomes a bottleneck, we could enhance StealthDE to support simultaneous split executions.
Figure 6. Delta Execution using StealthTest
B. Advantages over ForkDE
In addition to potential performance benefits due to the use of transactions in place of process forking, StealthDE offers other advantages compared to ForkDE. Multi-threading. With standard process forking, only the thread initiating fork is replicated on a child process. If non-duplicated threads are allowed to continue execution on the parent process, ForkDE would spuriously identify all the changes performed by them as delta data leading to unnecessary split/merges and validation failures. ForkDE addresses this issue by simply stopping all the other threads during split execution. StealthDE, by virtue of its atomic split execution, can provide merged execution for the rest of threads while providing split execution for the thread accessing delta state. Thus, threads do not have to be explicitly stopped. Threads that conflict with split execution can either be stalled or be allowed to proceed after aborting the split execution. System State. Process forking cannot duplicate all program state associated with an application (e.g., PID). Since StealthDE does not create a new process, system state is identical during split and merged executions. DeltaData Granularity. ForkDE tracks delta data at page-granularity, whereas StealthDE can track it at a much finer (e.g., word or cache-block) granularity. Thus, StealthDE reduces unnecessary split/merges caused by "false conflict" accesses to non-delta data.
VI. Evaluation
To evaluate StealthTest, we modify existing TM systems to support the StealthTest interface and then build StealthIV and StealthDE on top of them. We first describe the workloads and TM systems and then evaluate StealthIV and StealthDE. We show that both can effectively support online testing with low overhead. A. Workloads StealthIV Workloads. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of StealthIV on real bugs, we choose BugBench [19] , a set of real applications that each have at least one documented bug. We obtained 10 programs in a prerelease package from the authors. Table 2 gives some important characteristics of these programs (as reported by the original authors). Note that some of the programs contain atomicity bugs that require the use of NonAtomic tests (Section IV(B)) for detection.
The BugBench suite specifies bug-triggering inputs but not standard inputs which prevents us from comparing performance against ForkIV. Toward this goal, we use a set of four multithreaded workloads from the STAMP application suite [22] that come with standardized inputs and unit tests that could be run as IV tests. StealthDE Workloads. In order to evaluate StealthDE, we use the same set of applications and real software patches used in the original ForkDE study ( Table 3) . The inputs to the program are chosen to exercise code paths that had been patched while still being realistic. Server loads are tuned towards maximum throughput. 
B. TM Systems
As noted in Section III(D), TM systems that support StealthTest need to satisfy four requirements-strong atomicity, flexible conflict resolution, out-of-band communication mechanisms, and competitive performance. Currently only hardware TM systems promise to provide all the above properties, but these systems are not widely deployed and HTM simulators are slow.
Thus, to evaluate StealthTest for large real applications, we choose two software TM systems (for StealthIV) and a TM emulator (for StealthDE). While these systems either do not support strong atomicity or could incur high performance overheads; they do allow an evaluation of StealthTest using realistic applications.
StealthIV Implementations
StealthIV requires only a subset of the StealthTest interface that is supported by most TM systems. We choose two different STMs for building it. TL2 STM [6] . TL2 is a library-based TM system that provides a TM with lazy version management and commit-time conflict detection. We use the x86 port of TL2 provided with the STAMP application suite and use the existing interface to build StealthIV_TL2. Since librarybased systems require manual insertion of TM hooks for every transactional access, we use it only for STAMP applications that come with the hooks in place. Intel STM [16] . The Intel STM system is a languagebased TM system consisting of a C++ compiler (Prototype Edition 2.0) and an associated set of libraries providing TM functionality. We build StealthIV_ICC using the TM system's language extensions: __tm_atomic for specifying StealthTest transactions and tm_pure procedures for out-of-band communication. The Intel STM system provides stable language-level support for working with the larger BugBench applications.
The STMs are installed on a quad-core workstation running RedHat Enterprise Linux 5. Note that these systems, as well as all publicly available STM systems, are weakly atomic. As discussed in Section III(D), certain tests run with these systems might violate transparency making our implementation less robust. However, we do not observe such violations in our evaluation.
StealthDE Implementation
In order to implement and evaluate StealthDE, we require open access to the TM system and language support. Since neither of the above TM systems provide both these features, we look elsewhere. Pin-based TM Emulation [21] . Pin is a dynamic instrumentation tool that allows flexible insertion of callback functions into an executing binary image. In order to study StealthDE, we extend a Pin-based strongly atomic TM emulator [31] to support all the features required by StealthTest and then build StealthDE on top of it. Programmers provide StealthDE with a patch description file that identifies regions in the execution binary where patched code differs from original code. StealthDE dynamically intercepts execution when it reaches one of these delta code regions. It then automatically injects the code shown in Figure 6 into the dynamic instruction stream to initiate delta execution. All memory accesses are similarly intercepted to check for transactional conflicts. Like ForkDE, our implementation supports elimination of dead stack values from delta data. However, it does not yet support the 'shadow memory' technique used by ForkDE to avoid turning internal memory allocation structures into delta data. It also has limited TM system call support. StealthDE runs on a 2-way SMP with 2.4 GHz Pentium 4 CPUs and 2.5 GB of memory.
C. StealthIV Results
Does StealthTest facilitate effective IV testing?
We develop IV tests for detecting the known bugs in BugBench programs and run them using StealthIV_ICC. 1 We find that IV tests run using StealthTest are able to capture the errors caused due to 6 out of the 10 bugs in the BugBench suite (right-most column in Table 2 ). With regards to the rest of the bugs (in SQUD, CVS, MSQL2 and MSQL3), it is possible to develop IV tests for exercising them. However, the code surrounding the bugs in these programs makes library and system calls. The Intel STM system does not yet support rollback and isolation of these operations. Hence, we are unable to run tests (as noted in Section III(E)) targeting the region surrounding the bug. As future TM systems add support for isolating and rolling back system call activity, we believe it will become possible to detect the bugs in these four programs. Note that ForkIV would also not support these tests since it too does not currently isolate and unroll library/system calls. 
Does StealthTest provide low overhead IV tests?
We evaluate the STAMP applications on the standard set of non-simulator inputs (using 4 threads). We run the provided unit tests as IV tests at varying TPM (tests per minute) using both ForkIV and StealthIV_TL2 2 . Figure 7 shows the execution time for the various runs normalized to runs where no IV tests were run (None). Running tests at the rate of 10^3 TPM, ForkIV could incur up to 3.3X degradation in performance (ForkIV-10^3 for Vacation). As expected, the performance overhead of ForkIV decreases as we decrease the frequency of IV tests. In contrast, the performance overhead of StealthIV_TL2 is statistically insignificant in all cases irrespective of frequency of test execution. Thus, we can conclude that StealthIV can execute orders of magnitude more IV tests when compared to ForkIV.
D. StealthDE Results
Does StealthDE facilitate effective Delta Execution?
We run the patch validation workloads on StealthDE with the same set of applications used by the original authors of ForkDE.
StealthDE runs DE correctly and validates patch executions for 6 of the 10 programs. Of the remaining, ATPhttpd has calls to read and write from network sockets within patched code that cannot be isolated and rolled back by our TM system. Similarly, MySQL5.0, OpenSSL and Squid have memory allocation functions within patched code that are not yet supported. While transactional support for network socket calls in ATPhttpd is tougher to implement, we believe that TM memory allocation support can be implemented [14] . Does StealthDE provide low-overhead Delta Execution? Since StealthDE uses emulation, we cannot make direct comparisons with the ForkDE implementation obtained from the original authors. Nevertheless, we present some key measurements ( Table 3) that enable a first-order estimation of StealthDE's overheads compared to ForkDE's overheads.
1. We have also run experiments with the Siemens test suite [15] where IV tests were developed without apriori knowledge of bugs. The tests detected 68% of the bugs in these programs.
2. With BugBench applications using StealthIV_ICC, the degradation in performance is also statistically insignificant in all applications except GZIP(~3%).
We first compare the split execution behaviors of ForkDE and StealthDE by measuring the number of split executions (Num Splits) and the average amount of delta data (ΔData) at end of split execution. We find the behavior to be similar but not exactly identical. The difference primarily arises since the two implementations patch code and track data at different granularities.
Next, we look at first-order differences in performance between the two systems. First, ForkDE incurs a substantial fork overhead that StealthDE avoids. We measure and report the fraction of total execution time spent in forking and merging test processes (Fork Overhead). Clearly, fork overhead could be extremely high (up to 65%). Second, unlike ForkDE, StealthDE executes patched and original code sequentially. We find that the fraction of total execution time spent in patched code is fairly small (except in tar where the 7% spent in patched execution is still much less than the 41% fork overhead). Thus, since StealthDE exhibits similar split execution behavior as ForkDE, we expect it to incur much lower overhead compared to ForkDE (except for MySQL where the overheads are similar). 
E. Discussion
Our results indicate that StealthTest-based frameworks could incur much lower relative overhead than their fork-based counterparts. However, these results do not reflect either the absolute performance overhead incurred by STMs or the additional overhead imposed by strong atomicity. Both these issues are areas of active research with recent results indicating that strong atomicity overheads could be as small as 10% [35] .
StealthTest provides an additional incentive to build efficient TM systems, including hardware support to provide strong atomicity with little overhead.
VII. Related Work
Testing for software bugs is traditionally done during development. As noted earlier, many promising approaches [18, 26, 28, 38, 39] extend bug detection to deployed applications. StealthTest attempts to provide a common framework for such approaches using TM as a low-overhead mechanism.
StealthTest leverages the sandboxing capability of TM to guarantee test transparency. Other mechanisms that provide transactional isolation and rollback can also permit sandboxing. They range from code-emulation (e.g., STEM [37] ), binary translation (e.g., Sprockets [32] ), databases ( [29] ) to hardware thread-level speculation (TLS) (e.g., [27] ). These mechanisms have been used in proposals targeted toward various software engineering goals like safety, reliability, security etc. StealthTest differs from the above proposals in its use of TM as a mechanism and its focus on software testing. We believe that for the emerging class of multi-threaded applications, TM can provide a simpler and faster online testing mechanism than existing state-of-the-art. TM transactions can incur much lower performance overhead than code-emulation or binary translation and are easier to use at application level than TLS (which provides only bounded transactions). Moreover, StealthTest does not require a global stop-the-world phase, unlike existing mechanisms [32, 37] .
VIII. Summary and Future Work
Testing is and will be an important challenge in software systems development. We propose StealthTest, an interface that enables transparent low-overhead online testing using TM. We demonstrate the utility of StealthTest with two complementary test frameworks for online bug detection and online patch validation.
Future work could include greater system call support to enable more online tests, exploring other testing scenarios (e.g., regression testing), supporting a wider range of online tests (e.g., multi-threaded tests), examining a wider range of test frameworks (e.g., [38, 41] ) and providing better debugging feedback with StealthTest.
